In this paper, we propose a new approach to anomaly detection by looking at the latent variable space to make the first step toward latent anomaly detection. Most conventional approaches to anomaly detection are concerned with tracking data which are largely deviated from the ordinary pattern. In this paper, we are instead concerned with the issue of how to track changes happening in the latent variable space consisting of the meta information existing behind observed data. For example, in the case of masquerade detection, the conventional task was to detect anomalous command lines related to masqueraders' malicious behaviors. Meanwhile we rather attempt to track changes of behavior patterns such as writing mails, making software, etc. which are information of more abstract level than command lines. The key ideas of the methods are: 1) constructing the model variation vector, which is introduced relative to the latent variable space, and 2) the latent anomaly detection is reduced to the issue of change-point detection for the time series that the model variation vector forms. We demonstrate through the experimental results using artificial data set and UNIX command data set that our method has significantly enhanced the accuracy of existing anomaly detection methods.
Introduction 1.Motivation of Mining Latent Anomalies
We are concerned with the issue of detecting anomalies from time series as accurately as possible. Typical examples include the issue of masquerade detection, the goal of which is to detect masqueraders' anomalous behaviors as early as possible with the lowest false alarm rates. A large number of studies on anomaly detection have been explored in the scenarios of security, failure detection, fraud detection, and so on. Most of them take the approach of detecting observed anomalies, which are observed data largely deviated from the ordinary regularity. Meanwhile, we propose a new approach to anomaly detection on the basis of latent anomalies. Here the latent anomalies are the incidents recognized as anomalies not necessarily in an observed data space but * Common Platform Software Research Laboratories, NEC † Common Platform Software Research Laboratories, NEC in a latent variable space specifying the data generation mechanism. Let us illustrate the issue of detecting latent anomalies through an example of masquerade detection using UNIX command sequences. The observed data space consists of UNIX commands themselves such as lpr, ftp, etc., while the latent variable space consists of meta information behind command lines, such as writing text, writing a code, and so on, which are not explicitly recognized from observed data. When we observe UNIX commands, there are two latent variables, namely meta information. The first one is from which behavioral pattern (user's action e.g., writing text or writing a code) the commands are generated. The second one is which a hidden state of generating commands (user's internal state representing way of typing commands) the user stays. Corresponding to these two latent variables, we define latent anomalies as those induced by structural changes of the variables, namely sudden change of (1) behavioral patterns, and (2) hidden states. They are latent because patterns or states cannot be observed directly. We are conventionally concerned with the issue of detecting anomalous command lines themselves or irregular command patterns by looking at the observed data space only. In contrast, in the new scenario of detecting latent anomalies, we are concerned with the issue of tracking anomalous events that occur in the latent variable space, e.g., the periodic pattern consisting of writing text and writing a code terminates and new behavior emerges.
Why is latent anomaly detection to be explored? The main reason is that we can possibly enhance the accuracy of detecting anomalous incidents by looking at not only the observed data space but also the latent variable space. In the scenario of masquerade detection from UNIX command sequences, for example, a masquerader may often conduct malicious behaviors, which do not necessarily induce any change of occurrence frequency of commands but drastically change usage patterns that are recognized as latent information behind the commands. This implies that there exist new types of anomalies which may not be detected by looking at the observed data space only. Hence, one could detect anomalous events more accurately if one could track such latent anomalies in addition to observed ones.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first one is to develop methods for detecting latent anomalies from time series. The methods consist of a probabilistic modeling with latent variables, a design of most fundamental algorithms for detecting latent anomalies, and a methodology of how to effectively combine observed anomalies with latent ones.
The second one is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the methods through the experiments using artificial data and UNIX command dataset including masquerade sequence [13] for anomaly detection. We show that the latent anomaly detection significantly improves conventional methods without using latent anomalies.
The key ideas of techniques for latent anomaly detection are summarized as follows. First, we quantify how the probabilistic model with latent variables changes over time to define the symmetrized model variation. Then, we show that the symmetrized model variation is decomposed into a number of subscores, each of which is corresponding to the one derived from a latent variable, or an observed data. Then, we define a model variation vector by a tuple of these subscores. We reduce the issue of latent anomaly detection into that of change-point detection over a stream of model variation vectors.
Throughout the paper, we illustrate the methodology as above using the hidden Markov model mixture model, but we can easily extend it to a more general model with hidden variables.
Related Work
Most typical approaches to anomaly detection include outlier detection [1, 2] , change point detection [3, 4, 5] , and anomalous behavior detection [6, 7] . The task of outlier detection is to extract data largely deviated relative to the ordinary data pattern. The task of change-point detection is to track the time point when a sudden change occurs in a time series. The task of anomalous behavior detection is to track from a time series an abnormal subsequence which is largely deviated relative to the ordinary behavior pattern. Many other methods including such as episode rule-based ones [8] , clustering-based ones [9] , sequentialpattern mining [10] , Markov monitoring [11] have also been studied. In all of them, however, anomalies to be detected were considered on the basis of the observed data space only, without looking at the latent variable space.
The technique of dynamic model selection (DMS [6, 7] ) has been proposed in the scenario of estimating probabilistic model sequences under the assumption that the model may change over time. In the case of finite mixture models, for example, the model denotes the mixture size, i.e., the number of components in the mixture. DMS has been applied to anomaly detection, in which anomalies are tracked by detecting the change of the mixture size. In this sense DMS is also closely related to latent anomaly detection, but cannot be applied to the case where one has to detect any change in the latent variable space even when models are kept the same over time.
Probabilistic models with latent variables including finite mixture models, hidden Markov models, independent component analysis model, etc. have extensively been studied. However, the anomalies in the latent variable space have been paid scat attentions. Very recently techniques of change detection in the latent variable space have been applied to the context of bursty topic mining from text stream [12] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 yields a formal framework of latent anomaly detection. Section 3 yields detailed descriptions of our proposed methodology of latent anomaly detection. Section 4 shows experimental results obtained using an artificial data and the UNIX command sequence [13] for masquerade detection [13, 14, 15] . Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
2 Problem Settings 2.1 Probabilistic Models Let us denote Y as a finite set of discrete symbols. We consider time t to be discrete. At each time step t, we observe a sequence of discrete symbols belonging to Y, which we denote by, y t = (y t,1 , · · ·, y t,Tt )∈Y Tt , where T t is the length of the sequence. For example, when the input data is a set of UNIX commands such as (command1 = ls, command2 = cat, command3 = netscape, command4 = netscape, · · ·), we divide them into sequences i.e., sequence1 = y 1 = (ls, cat), sequence2 = y 2 = (netscape, netscape), · · ·. For example, we can construct a sequence as a command sequence of fixed length. Thus, a sequence represents meaningful fragment of user's command action. A time step represents a label of sequences' time order.
For the modeling of data-generation of such sequences, we consider a probabilistic model in which a finite number of sequential behavioral patterns are mixed and state transitions exist in each pattern. As a concrete probabilistic model of such kinds, we employ the mixture of hidden Markov model(HMM)s, without loss of generality. In it, the behavioral pattern and state transitions may be both specified by latent variables.
Let K be a positive integer. We employ HMM mixtures for representing probability distribution p t (y) of a sequence y at time t:
where for each i ∈ {1, .., K}, π i,t denotes the mixture coefficient such that i π i,t = 1 and π i,t > 0, and p i,t (y) denotes the i-th component of the mixture represented as an HMM. We call each component of the mixture a cluster. Then, behavioral patterns are represented by the probability distribution over the clusters.
Let X be a finite set of discrete symbols. We call the element in X a state. For each i and t, let a i,t (x|x ) (x, x ∈ X ) be a state transition matrix and let b i,t (y|x) (x ∈ X , y ∈ Y) be a probability that a state x generates an observed value y. Let γ i,t (x) be an initial probability distribution of x ∈ X . Then the i-th cluster is written as follows:
Notice that two kinds of latent variables are included in this model. One is the cluster index i indicating which behavioral pattern is generated. The other is x in each cluster indicating which state appears in the fixed behavioral pattern. Hence the latent variable space in this model consists of {i = 1, ..., K}×X .
We call the anomalies induced in the latent variable space latent anomalies.
In order to detect the latent anomalies, we employ HMM mixtures for representing probability distribution p t (y) of sequence y as mentioned in Section 2.1. HMM mixtures are appropriate for our purpose because it is possible to represent the behavioral patterns by mixtures for detecting latent anomaly (1) , and the hidden state by a and b matrix of each HMM for detecting latent anomaly (2) . In Refs. [7, 15] , it is demonstrated that HMM mixtures are effective for representing behavioral patterns and can be successfully applied to anomalous behavior detection from UNIX commands, syslogs, etc.
Learning the Model
In order to detect latent anomalies for a given observed sequence, first, the model has to be learned and then, each data has to be scored on the basis of the estimated model. In this subsection, we describe how to learn the mixture of HMMs.
We can straightforwardly apply the on-line discounting learning algorithm proposed in [7] to the learning of our model. The parameters of the model are dynamically learned using the on-line discounting learning algorithm, which conducts parameter estimation by gradually forgetting out-of-date statistics as time goes on.
Latent Anomaly Detection 3.1 Model Variation and Model Decomposition
In this section, we introduce a method of scoring the anomalousness of each data on the basis of the learned model as in the previous section.
Our goal is to detect latent anomalies in order to enhance anomaly detection accuracy. As mentioned in Section 1.1, each sequence has two latent variables, (1) from which behavioral pattern (user's action e.g., writing text or writing a code) the sequence is generated, and (2) which hidden state of generating commands (user's internal state representing way of typing commands) the user stays. Latent anomalies are those induced by structural changes of the variables, namely sudden change of (1) behavioral patterns, and (2) hidden states.
For detecting latent anomalies, we introduce a method of scoring the anomalousness of each data on the basis of the learned model as mentioned in the previous section.
We make the following two steps.
Step 1. Model Variation Vector Construction
We define model variation vectors α t and β t by Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4), respectively.
Here (α t ) i and (β t ) i are the i-th components of α t and β t , respectively. D(p(·)||q(·)) denotes the KullbackLeibler (KL) divergence between two probability distributions: p and q are defined as Eq. (3.5), r i,t (x) is the eigenvector of the matrix a i,t corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 (see Eq. (3.6)).
Here the log is taken with the natural base. Each component of α t can be thought of as the variation of the matrix a i,t (x |x). Thus, the value of α t measures how significantly the overall hidden state transition has changed. Meanwhile, each component of β t can be thought of as the variation of the matrix b i,t (y|x). Thus, the value of β t measures how significantly the relation among observed symbols and hidden states has changed.
Thus, both of α t and β t measure the degree to what extent the anomalies appearing in the latent variable space have affected the model variation.
Finally, we define a vector s t as the sum of the two model variation vectors α t and β t :
Each component of s t can be thought of as the variation of the probability distribution of each cluster, hence the 1-norm of s t can be considered as the variation of total model.
Step 2. Change-Point Score Computation Once we have vectors s t , α t and β t according to the method of Step 1 for each t, we may conduct the procedure of change-point detection for the time series {s t } t , {α t } t and {β t } t to track the significant changes in them. Here the change-point detection is the process of giving to each time point a score of measuring how significantly the nature of time series has changed at the time point. We describe the details of the mechanism of changepoint scoring in Section 3.3. In this section, assuming that some change-point scoring method is given, we discuss how to evaluate latent anomalies and observed anomalies.
We define the following scores of five kinds;
S α (y t ) = (change point score of vector α t ), (3.8) S β (y t ) = (change point score of vector β t ), (3.9)
S s (y t ) = (change point score of vector s t ), (3.10) S α (y t ) + S β (y t ) = (sum of change point score of α t and change point score of β t ),
The score S α measures how significantly the rates of transitions among symbols have changed. The score S β measures how significantly the occurrence frequency of each symbol has changed. The score S s measures how significantly the transition rate and the frequencies have changed. The score S α + S β is the logical sum of S α and S β The score in Eq. (3.12) is defined as a product in order to take into account the model variation itself (namely 1-norm of s t ).
Each scoring corresponds to the detection of anomalies of a different type. We consider here that data of higher scores have caused latent anomalies. We emphasize here that our methods enable us to score the total anomalousness by decomposing it into the anomalies of different types in an explicit way.
Interpretation of Model Variation Vector
We give an interpretation to the model variation vectors, s t , α t and β t from the view of the model decomposition and give their rationale.
In order to detect anomalies, either observed or latent anomalies, it is necessary to estimate anomalousness of the observed value y. For this purpose, we employ the KL-divergence D(p t−1 ||p t ) as an anomalousness measure. This quantity represents how large p t has moved from p t−1 after learning with y t . Thus, y t with large KL-divergence is anomalous in the sense that it greatly contributes to changing a probabilistic model.
In order to detect latent anomalies, we decompose the anomalousness measure D(p t−1 ||p t ) into a number of parts so that each part represents how large the model change has been caused by the change of one latent variable space. For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote a combination of a hidden state x and an observed value y as z ((x, y) = z) and write z as z T when we like to express that x and y have T components. Hereafter, we compute the KL-divergence under the following assumptions: Assumption 1: The length T t of a sequence at each time t is large enough (T t = T →∞) independently of t. In addition, the stochastic process of Markovian transition of hidden state x has a stationary state r (lim T →∞ a T γ = r). Assumption 2: For most of z, each belongs to a single cluster (in other words, the overlaps among clusters are negligible) so that the following equalities holds:
We have made two assumptions for the reasons as follows. First, we need to fix the sequence length T when we compute the KL-divergence. However, we do not know typical or optimal T . In this situation, it is natural to choose T = ∞ because we can compare two models under the same condition, namely we can compare stationary states of two models, in the limit of T = ∞. Note that Assumption 1 is not required for learning models but required for computing the KLdivergence. Namely, we do not assume that observed sequences used for learning models have infinitely long T . Assumption 2 implies that most of sequences belong to a single behavioral pattern. Under our problem settings, it is natural to make this assumption because it becomes impossible to define behavioral patterns if the assumption is violated.
Below we show the decomposition of the KLdivergence. We define the model variation quantity for the i-th cluster at time t by D(p i,t−1 (z)||p i,t (z) ), and the symmetrized model variation at time t by  D(p t−1 ||p t ) + D(p t ||p t−1 ) . Under the assumptions we have made, the symmetrized model variation can be decomposed into a number of parts so that each part represents how large the model change has been caused by the change of one latent variable space. This is formally proven by the following two lemmas. The proofs of the lemmas are shown in Appendices A and B. From the lemmas, it is shown that the decomposition of the KL-divergence consists of two steps.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the symmetrized model variation is decomposed into the sum of (s t ) i 's;
First, the KL-divergence is decomposed into (s t ) i 's, components of the vector s t . Lemma 3.1 shows that the symmetrized model variation coincides with the 1−norm of the vector s t , and each (s t ) i represents the degree of a change of each model of a behavioral pattern. This gives a rationale of s t since the symmetrized model variation can be a measure of how significantly the model has changed. Hence, the latent anomalies induced by sudden change of behavioral patterns can be detected by tracking sudden change of the vector
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption 1, the vector s t is decomposed into the sum of α t and β t ;
Second, each component of s t , (s t ) i , is decomposed into the sum of (α t ) i and (β t ) i . 
Step 2 in Section 3.1, we employ the method proposed in Ref. [4] , which we briefly summarize below.
Let u t be either α t , β t or s t . A time series {u t : t = 1, 2, ...} is learned with an autoregression (AR) model. Here the model parameters of the AR model are estimated using an on-line discounting learning algorithm for which the out-of-date statistics are gradually forgotten as time goes on. We denote the probability density function of the learned model as p AR (u t |u t−1 ) ((t = 1, 2, · · ·)).
For each time t the logarithmic score for u t relative to p AR is written as −logp AR (u t |u t−1 ). We then define a time series {v t : t = 1, 2, ...} by a moving average of the logarithmic score for {u t : t = 1, 2, ...}:
logP AR (u t |u t−1 ), (3.18) where w(≥ 1) is a given window size.
Then v t is further learned with another AR model {v t : t = 1, 2, ...} using the on-line discounting learning algorithm as above. We denote the probability density function of the learned model asp AR (v t |v t−1 ). Finally, we compute a change-point score S t at each time step t by
which measures how significantly the nature of the timeseries has changed. A higher score indicates that a bursty change has occurred in the time series. The validity of this change-point scoring method has been demonstrated in [4] .
Experiments and Discussions
We performed two experiments in order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method in comparison with existing methods We evaluated them in terms of how early anomalies could be detected for the same level of false alarm rates.
Data Set
We employed an artificial data set and UNIX command data set [13] for masquerade detection . Both data sets consisted of 15000 symbols. A symbol represented a unit of action, for example, a UNIX command in Section 4.3. We divided each data set into 1500 blocks of 10 symbols each and called a block session (same as a sequence). We represented the order of the sessions using index t (t = 1, · · ·, 1500). The index t and a session corresponded to the time step t and observed discrete symbol sequence y t , respectively, in the context of our problem settings (see Section 2). Each data set had labels which indicate whether each session is anomalous or not. Using these labels, we evaluated the accuracy of anomaly detection for each method.
For representing a probabilistic model of session generation, we employed an HMM mixture as mentioned in Section 2.1. Here the mixture size (the number of components in the mixture model) was fixed to 2 in Section 4.2 and was fixed to 5 in Section 4.3. The number of hidden states in each HMM was fixed to 3. At each time step, one session was input and the model was learned using the on-line discounting learning algorithm (see Section 2.2).
After the learning process was finished, we gave scores to each data using our proposed method (see Eqs. (3.8)∼(3.12) and existing methods. As for the existing methods, we employed the HMM mixture based scoring (without using the latent variable space) and the Naive Bayes based scoring. Their corresponding scoring functions S HM M and S N B were respectively calculated as follows:
Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21) are the logarithmic loss for a session when a probabilistic model of session generation is an HMM mixture (θ denotes the parameters of the model) and Naive Bayes model (NB), respectively. Note that NB is reduced to the special case of an HMM mixture where K = 1 and hidden state set X consists of a single state, which we write as σ. With the same notation as Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2), a probability distribution of NB is written as
We employed the scoring methods as above to conduct anomaly detection. Data to which our proposed methods give higher scores include latent anomalies, while those to which the existing ones give high scores are considered to be observed anomalies only. We evaluated the performance of all of the methods in terms of how early anomalies could be detected for constant false alarm rates.
In order to evaluate how early anomalies could be detected, we measured how many percents of the first ∆ sessions of anomalous sessions were detected for constant false alarm rates. Namely, we did not consider all anomalous sessions but rather those which appeared just after the starting point of the anomaly to be detected. We denote the number of sessions to be detected as ∆. In the experiments, we set ∆ = 5, 10 or 50. If a method takes a high value of the quantity for constant false alarm rates, in the case of small ∆, it is implied that the method has succeeded in detecting anomalies early enough.
Then, we drew a curve in which the horizontal axis showed the false-positive rate and the vertical axis showed how many percents of the first ∆ sessions of anomalous sessions were detected. The quantity which the vertical axis showed can be thought of being similar to what we call the average score defined in [3] . Hence, hereafter, we call this quantity average score. Followed by the definition, the average score was a measure of how early anomalies were detected. For each of the method, we employed the area under its corresponding curve (AUC) R, which was normalized to 1 (0 ≤ R ≤ 1), as the criterion for its detection accuracy. A method with higher R indicates its higher detection accuracy. This is because a curve is lifted up and R becomes larger when the detection accuracy becomes higher for the same level of false positive rates. A method with R = 1 can detect all starting points of anomalies with no time delay. On the other hand, that with R = 0 can not detect any starting points of anomalies in defined time range.
Behavioral Pattern Change Detection for
Artificial Data First, we conducted experiments on anomaly detection using an artificial data set.
Data Set
The artificial data set was sequence of two patterns, which we explain below, and included an anomaly where the occurrence frequency of each pattern changed. In this experiment, we tested whether our proposed methods could detect the behavioral pattern change of this kind earlier than the existing methods which do not take into account latent variable space.
For an experiment, we made an artificial data as shown in Figure 1 . It consisted of 15000 symbols and each symbol was included in a finite set, {a, b, c, d, e, l, m, n, o, p}. We defined ten kinds of tu- This data included a simulated change of behavioral patterns (see the right panel of Figure 1 ). In this data, index j of v ji (i = 1, · · ·, 5) represents a pattern because there is no transition between the two symbol sets {a, b, c, d, e} and {l, m, n, o, p} . Thus, the data is considered to be a sequence of Pattern 1 consisting of v 1· and Pattern 2 consisting of v 2· . From the 1001st to the 1052nd sessions, the occurrence frequency of each pattern changes. This change corresponds to that of behavioral patterns.
Considering the 1001st∼1052nd sessions to be anomalous sessions, we conducted an experiment on anomaly detection. By learning an HMM mixture with the on-line discounting learning algorithm, we gave scores to each session according to the method in Section 3.1. The definition of scores follows Eqs. (3.8)∼(3.12), (4.20) and (4.21). We repeated this procedure 50 times and estimated R as in Section 4.1. Employing the average of R as an evaluation criterion, we compared performance of our proposed method with those of the existing methods.
Results and Discussions
As results of anomaly detection using 7 kinds of scores, the average area under the curve, R (0≤R≤1), are summarized in Table 1 .
From Table 1 we observed that our proposed method outperformed NB and HMM. This indicates that our proposed method detected the change of behavioral patterns earlier than the existing methods.
HMM and NB did not perform well in this experiment. At the starting point of the anomalous sessions, sessions of pattern 1 appear. After the starting point, the scores of HMM and NB of Pattern 1 decreased because the occurrence frequency of Pattern 1 increased. Thus, in the case of pattern change detection of this kind, it is expected that performance of better learner becomes worse when only occurrence frequency is taken into account. As expected, HMM performed worse than NB.
From these results, it was shown that our proposed method detected the anomalies which could not be detected by the existing methods since the former detected latent anomalies as well as observed ones while the latter detected observed ones only. In this experiment, from which pattern a session is generated is latent information and the sudden change of the occurrence frequency of each pattern is a latent anomaly. When we employed larger ∆, the performance of our proposed method became worse. The reason of this phenomenon is as follows. The proposed method detected a change point of model variation vectors. The change point corresponded to a starting point of an anomalous sequence. Therefore, the proposed method was inadequate for detecting outliers which were not induced from changes of data structures.
Masquerade
Detection from UNIX Command Sequence Second, we applied our methods to masquerade detection.
Experimental Settings
We used the data which was analyzed in the masquerade detection study by Schonlau et al [13] . As described in [13] , the data set included 70 users' UNIX command sequence. Data for each user consisted of 15000 commands. The 70 users were divided into the class of 50 target users and that of 20 masqueraders. The first 5000 commands of all the target 50 users included no masquerade sequence. The remaining 10000 commands of each target user were divided into 100 blocks of 100 commands each. These blocks were seeded with masquerading users, i.e. with data of a user in 20 masqueraders. At any given block after the 5000 commands, a masquerade started with a probability of 1%. If a previous block was a masquerade, then the next one will also be a masquerade with a probability of 80%. This data set is available for download from http://www.schonlau.net/.
Each user's data had labels which indicated whether each block was masquerader or not. Using these labels, we evaluated the masquerade detection accuracy of each method. We divided each user into 1500 blocks of 10 commands and called a block session.
From the 50 users' data sets, we selected 18 data sets for the evaluation. These data sets were all of the ones such that the length of a masquerade sequence was not less than 500 commands. The reason why we selected these data sets is that we concentrate our research on the detection of bursty change of behavioral patterns or data structures, rather than outlier detection.
By learning an HMM mixture with the on-line discounting learning algorithm and scoring each session, we performed masquerade detection. The definition of scores follows Eqs. Employing area under the curve as in Section 4.1, R, as an evaluation criterion, we compared the masquerade detection performance of our proposed methods with those of the existing methods.
Results and Discussions
As results of masquerade detection using 7 kinds of scores, the average area under the curve, R (0≤R≤1), of 18 users are summarized in Table 2 . One of the curves is shown in Figure From Table 2 , we observed that our proposed methods outperformed NB and HMM for a small ∆. When ∆ = 5, the average R of our proposed methods using five kinds of scores was about 8% larger than HMM and about 25% larger than NB. This result indicates that the proposed methods, which detect latent anomalies, detected masquerades 8∼25% earlier than HMM and NB. It was also shown that change detection of behavioral patterns was effective for early detection of anomalous behaviors. In contrast to the case of ∆ = 5, HMM outperformed the proposed methods for ∆ = 50( 500 commands). The proposed methods detected a change point of model variation vectors, and a change point corresponded to a starting point of a masquerade sequence. Therefore, the proposed methods were inadequate for detecting outlier sessions which were located away from the point. Here outlier sessions represent a kind of observed anomalies which are not caused by busty behavior changes but are recognized as statistical outliers. On the other hand, the existing methods detected outlier sessions which were deviated relative to the learned model of data generation. Thus, they could detect masquerade sessions which were located away from the starting point. We may say that the proposed methods are adequate for early detection of anomalies where model structure changes, while HMM is adequate for detecting isolated anomalous events.
Regardless of which methods were employed, the performance became worse for larger ∆. There are two reasons for this degradation. One is that the proposed methods were inadequate for detecting outlier sessions.
The other is that, with the on-line discounting learning algorithm, models were learned adaptively to nonstationary environments. If many sessions consisting of the same command sequence are included in the masquerade sequence, a session of this kind coming after many masquerade sessions is given a lower score value than that included in the first several sessions of the sequence because models have been adapted to generation of repeated masquerade sessions. Thus, the both methods which we compared each other are insensitive to masquerade sessions which have been repeated many times.
We observed from Table 2 that S s and S β lead to approximately the same results, and S α + S β lead to better results than S s . This observation indicates the following two things. First, β t contributed to s t much more than α t . Second, α t played an important role in enhancing a detection accuracy. In the case of S α + S β , the change point scores of α t and β t were treated with even weight, though α t was much smaller than β t . Namely, it is possible to enhance the detection accuracy in this experiment by emphasizing the hidden state variable space. This implies that it is effective for early detection of anomalous behaviors to utilize not only information of a latent variable indicating a behavioral pattern but also that of a hidden state variable x in each behavioral pattern. From Table 2 , we observed that the masquerade detection performance became worse when we neglected β t . Therefore, it is better that we employ a score such as S(y t ) = cS α (y t ) + (1 − c)S β (y t ) with optimal coefficient c, though we do not deal with its optimization issue in this paper.
We also observed that S s ×e † s outperformed S s . This observation indicates that by taking into account the 1-norm of s t , the score became insensitive to noisy fluctuation of s t around the origin. As a result, S s ×e † s t lead to a better performance.
Summarizing the results of this experiment, it was shown that the proposed methods work better than existing ones since the former can detect latent anomalies as well as observed ones while the latter detect observed anomalies only. Unlike the case of the artificial data, it was difficult to identify latent anomalies. However, there are two possible candidates for latent anomalies. One is, a sudden change of the occurrence frequency of each pattern. This is because we may expect that sudden changes of behavioral patterns occur when masquerade sequence starts. The other is a sudden change of structures of a hidden state transition. This change corresponds to the change of the appearance order of UNIX commands in some behavioral patterns. The change is latent because behavioral patterns are not observed directly. From the experimental results it was shown that it was possible to enhance detection accuracy, by Giving a more weight to α t than β t . Components of α t represent how significantly the hidden state transition has changed. Thus, a change of the appearance order of commands in a behavioral pattern can be thought of as one of latent anomalies.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed methods of detecting latent anomalies. The key ideas of the methods are; 1) constructing the model variation vector, which is introduced relative to the latent variable space, and 2) the latent anomaly detection is reduced to the issue of change-point detection for the time series that model variation vector forms. We have demonstrated through the experimental results using artificial data set and UNIX command data set that our methods have significantly enhanced the accuracy of existing anomaly detection methods, namely the HMM mixture based scoring without using the latent variable space and the Naive Bayes based scoring. Future works include further extension of our proposed methods by combining it with the existing dynamic model selection method [7] to establish a more general framework of anomaly detection using the latent variable space. 3) and (3.4) .
From Eqs. (1.31) and (2.34), it can be seen that Lemma 3.2 holds.
